INTRODUCTION
The European Commission has sought to conclude far-reaching Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with sub-regions of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group under the Cotonou Agreement . The EPAs involve extensive trade liberalisation, moving beyond tariff reductions to wider 'behind the border' issues relating to services liberalisation. In this context, scholarly attention has been paid to ACP elite agency within the negotiations. Notably, Hurt et al (2013) argue that African officials demonstrate discursive power in holding European counterparts to account in terms of 'development'. ACP negotiators have delayed the signing of EPAs until European states acquiesce to demands on transitional aid. This is understood by Hurt et al (2013) in terms of the rhetorical entrapment of the EU.
This view is broadly corroborated by Heron (2014: 18) who explains that the normative dimension of the EPAs has opened up space for critical contestation, and hence delays to conclusion (amidst ACP demands for aid). These perspectives are echoed within the longer history of ACP-EU trade -for instance, Zartman (1971: 4) arguing that 'weaker' African states may 'provoke an encounter' with Europe -conducive to winning concessions in trade negotiations.
This article contributes to debates surrounding ACP officials' elite agency within trade negotiations. It questions, however, whether the successful demonstration of elite agency is necessarily 'progressive' in terms of outcomes for poorer citizens. In contrast to Hurt et al (2013) , it explores how ACP elites' recourse to strategies of extraversion may have a negative impact for development (Bayart 2010) . Namely, deliberate appeals to the 'external' for additional aid monies may not result in positive outcomes. In this discussion, the article specifically examines the recently agreed EPA between West African (ECOWAS) 1 states and the EU in relation to an EPA Development Programme (EPADP). West African officials argue that Cotonou's promise to realise the 'development dimension' of trade can only be fulfilled through the provision of generous Aid for Trade (AfT) and private sector development (PSD) assistance via the EPADP (ECOWAS 2009) . 2 This will apparently resolve supply-side constraints in agricultural and manufacturing sectors and (nominally) ensure a level playing field with European counterparts. Furthermore, the EPADP will compensate West African governments for tariff revenue losses incurred upon EPA implementation. The EPADP will thus provide financial means by which West African governments can continue to invest in enabling business infrastructure such as roads, pylons, and sanitation (Dalleau and Van Seters 2011) . EPA trade opening will thus be made 'development friendly'.
The article underscores how the EPADP has been a source of tension in the negotiations. In particular, it highlights debates as to whether EPADP resources will be 'new Crucially, in terms of a critical perspective on elite agency, the article then challenges whether or not ECOWAS officials' extraversion (defined as the strategic recourse to the 'external') in relation to the EPADP will bring about pro-poor growth. It examines how extraversion may lock-in West African states into disadvantageous trade regimes detrimental to the wider economic base (and to the livelihoods of poorer citizens), while lubricating often corrupt power networks. Again, this departs from the existing literature on ACP agency that often assumes pro-poor outcomes. In this discussion, the first section of the article examines the historical evolution of Europe's relations with ACP countries, and explains the current policy focus upon EPA free market reform combined to PSD/AfT. The second section then assesses negotiations for the ECOWAS EPA and the strategic position of the EPADP therein.
The third section then considers the consequences of market opening and the capacity of the EPADP instrument for delivering genuine 'pro-poor' outcomes in West Africa. Significantly, the article then underscores how extraversion in this instance may result in regressive outcomes for 'the poor' (Bayart 2010 . This earlier period of Association was predicated on preferential and non-reciprocal trade, as inspired by the New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Brown 2002) . This phase of relations was not without its criticisms -based both on lack of developmental success and the characterisation of Lomé as neo-colonialist (Brown 2002; Hurt 2003 Reference was also made to the European Commission's pledge to provide €1 billion in AfT 3 ECOWAS official, Mohammed Daramy, made clear that 'among the reasons was the inability of the European Union (EU) countries to provide the funds to take care of the adjustment costs under the EPA' (cited in Nduwugwe 2008) support per annum to developing countries (as a whole) as part of WTO Doha Round pledges. Unconvincingly, however, the report claimed that such monies would be additional to EDF resources -despite the fact that the EDF is included within calculations of EU AfT assistance However, Europe has explained that it is unwilling to finance a full €9.5 billion for the EPADP.
Instead it will be prepared to finance €6.5 billion derived from existing channels. This has, that 'the EU's continued refusal to substantially and specifically commit to meet fiscal adjustment costs that the EPA will impose on ECOWAS economies as well as for 4 Interestingly, Draper (2014) and Siles-Brugge (2014a; 2014b) explain that parallel EU trade negotiations (for instance with the USA regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) are important for understanding Europe's global strategy vis-à-vis 'competitive liberalisation', and for making sense of the position of ACP countries. In particular, Draper explains that norms regarding services liberalisation are being embedded within parallel arrangements, likely influencing African countries' own acceptance of such measures within the EPAs. The impact of 'mega deals' upon the ACP-EU relationship is an interesting element that, although not within the remit of our current discussion, is something which deserves closer scrutiny in the Africa-EU literature. West African officials have emphasised the EPADP as a means of promoting both offensive and defensive trade interests in their negotiations with the European Commission. The EPADP will (nominally) promote both productive capacity in the region and ensure that negative consequences experienced upon EPA implementation will be compensated. In order to examine the development capacity of the proposed EPADP, however, it is necessary to first consider the likely impact of the EPA upon West African producers and fiscal revenues. Only in this context can an evaluation be made in terms of whether the EPADP will provide sufficient resources to meaningfully marry free trade to development outcomes. Usefully, a number of studies provide detail on the likely repercussions of an EPA. These cover impacts of tariff dismantling upon agricultural and manufacturing sectors, policy space for pro-poor trade measures, impacts upon tariff revenues, and consequences for intra-regional trade flows.
In relation to this first major issue of impacts upon (predominantly import-competing) agricultural and food sectors, it is necessary to underscore that this sphere of economic activity provides livelihoods for 70% of West Africa's working population. Moreover, agriculture provides between 30-40% of the region's total GDP (Gérard and Bilal 2008: 236) . In this context, there are growing concerns about the long-term consequences of an EPA. Patel (2007: 18) explains that tariff elimination will lead to loss of livelihoods for West African smallholders given their relative lack of capacity in comparison with European producers. Significantly, he cites the European Commission's own Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on an ECOWAS EPA which anticipates significant import surges of up to 16% for onions, 15% for potatoes, 16% for beef, and 18% for poultry -thereby displacing domestic production in the It is important to also note that this crucial issue of food (in)security is severely exacerbated in West Africa by existing 'pay, fish, and go' EU access agreements that threaten local livelihoods and deplete fish stocks (Atta-Mills 2004: 20) . Significantly, these asymmetric agreements, that allow European super-trawlers to overfish in the region, will remain in force despite the potential conclusion of an ECOWAS EPA. Furthermore, Europe's current offer to allow West African states the opportunity to place up to 20% of tariff lines into a sensitive goods 'basket' subject to delayed liberalisation is deemed grossly insufficient in relation to food security concerns. Nwoke (2009: 10) Enterplan (2005: 40) , moreover, points to the loss of 30,000 jobs in textiles manufacturing in Nigeria under SAP reforms. This will be repeated if an EPA is signed, with imports of EU manufactured goods to Nigeria expected to increase by US $600 milliondisplacing local production (Nwoke 2009: 21) .
Accordingly, many stakeholders fear that deindustrialisation will be entrenched by an EPA. Indeed, in light of Europe's insistence upon the immediate liberalisation of 80% of total ECOWAS tariff lines, there are particular concerns that vital sectors such as apparel, soap manufacturing, carpet manufacturing, and confectionary production (among others) will not be included within a sensitive goods basket. Agricultural sectors will be given priority on the basis of food security, leaving sensitive manufacturing sectors highly vulnerable to import surges from the EU (Adenikinju and Alaba 2005: 19) . This will have severely negative effects upon urban centres whose poorer populations are dependent upon domestic manufacturing jobs.
In addition to these 'defensive' trade concerns, there are also grounds upon which to doubt whether the safeguarding of low tariff access to European markets under an EPA will promote 'offensive' trade opportunities for West African manufacturing. Regardless of EPADP assistance, ECOWAS producers remain hampered by stringent rules of origin (ROOs) that in many cases effectively close down exports to the EU. In relation to fisheries, for example, ROOs mean that countries such as Ghana may not take fish from neighbouring ECOWAS states' waters for processing purposes.
5 Moreover, West African countries must own the trawlers fishing in their national waters -otherwise the fish caught are deemed as foreign under European ROOs (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002: 78-84) . This means that i) local fish processing and canning facilities are deprived of potential raw materials; ii) West African producers cannot access EU markets on a competitive basis; and iii) ECOWAS regional integration is penalised (ibid). Combined to restrictive hygiene standards, ROOs are one of the main reasons why West
African states acquiesce to 'pay, fish and go' EU access agreements in the first place.
Crucially, ROOs and hygiene requirements are not subject to EPA negotiations and will not be resolved upon the signing of an agreement. Additionally, high EU tariffs placed upon processed goods emanating from West Africa will not be lowered upon agreement of an EPAsince the talks aim only to preserve existing levels of ACP access. Entry of processed cocoa goods, for instance, will continue to face debilitating protectionist tariffs imposed by the European Commission. Exports of cocoa raw materials (however) will continue to receive duty free treatment in order to satisfy processors based in the EU (Solidar 2008: 14) . The worrisome defensive trade issues experienced by ACP countries under EPA liberalisation are therefore unlikely to be compensated by greater opportunities for 'offensive' exports to EU destinations.
More broadly, there are concerns that an EPA will close down policy space for pro-poor Moreover, a more recent study by the South Centre has concluded that total ECOWAS tariff revenue losses would reach €1.8 billion in the immediate year following EPA conclusion (cited in EuropAfrica 2011). These concerns are combined to fears surrounding the diminution of intra-regional trade as a result of trade diversion. Namely, EPA tariff reductions upon EU imports will mean that European products will become more affordable to citizens in middle income brackets -thereby displacing imports from West African destinations. 6 Togolese exports to its ECOWAS partners, for instance, are expected to decline by 16.22% (Karingi 2005: 50 ). This will have obvious revenue implications. Nigeria alone is itself expected to lose US $229 million in any given year as a result of lost exports to ECOWAS partners (Busse and Großmann 2007: 795) . This will also affect importing ECOWAS states since most EU goods benefitting from trade diversion will not be subject to tariffs, unlike non-EU imports.
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It is in this context that any evaluation of the EPADP must take place. Namely, the prospect of agricultural decline, deindustrialisation, receding policy space, disruption of intraregional trade, and lost tariff revenues must be weighed against the resources of AfT/PSD aid.
As stated, the European Commission has rejected the prospect of €9.5 billion and has instead proposed €6.5 billion derived from existing channels. Significantly, West African officials appear to have acquiesced to the lower figure of €6.5 billion -the remaining issue is thus whether EPADP resources will be made available in addition to existing funds. Mohammed Moreover, EPADP resources appear financially anaemic in relation to EU export gains to West Africa amounting to US $1.87 billion in any given year upon conclusion of an ECOWAS EPA, as well as annual CAP subsidies to EU dairy farmers alone of around €5 billion per year (Lang 2006: 12; ActionAid 2011: 4 Bayart's concept of extraversion is important in the analysis of West Africa-EU relations in that it illustrates the role of African policy elites in making strategic appeals to the norms, and interests, of the external European 'partner'. Rather than exist as passive victims of economic agendas imposed by the European Commission, West African negotiators exhibit a high degree of agency in their construction of the EPADP. Mirroring the language of Cotonou on the need for socially equitable market-opening and job-creating PSD/AfT interventions, the EPADP document makes an explicit appeal for Europe to fulfil its normative commitments to the ECOWAS region, and (more implicitly) to the ACP bloc as a whole. This coincides with Hurt et al (2013) to the extent that they point to ACP elites' utilisation of rhetorical entrapment.
It is important to recognise, however, that such strategies of extraversion are not a novel feature of Africa-Europe relations, whether in the colonial period itself or in terms of When we become mature, we are going to leave the family house, where we have so often been spoiled, and also sometime reprimanded… to found our own house, our own hearth. I would like to tell you that in leaving the French family, we do not intend to forget all that we have received from it. We would like, instead, to develop and to enrich the large patrimony which it has left to us, to the benefit of our people (cited in Bayart 2010: 196) . Overall, therefore, it is important to restate that West African elites have engaged in strategies of extraversion characterised by their acquiescence to the logic of private sector competition and free market opening embodied in the EPAs. In so doing, they remain locked into a dependency relationship with the EU that will likely lead to further neoliberal reform, albeit with the potential for maximising their own short term gains (particularly for lubrication of domestic power networks) through PSD/AfT assistance. This, however, bodes ill for vulnerable producers and workers in the region who will likely face severe social disruption upon the implementation of free market reforms. Extraversion -and ECOWAS elite agency in EPA negotiations-does not represent a positive force for development, quite the contrary.
CONCLUSION
The European Union has sought to promote PSD/AfT assistance to the ACP bloc as a strategic means of aligning EPAs to legitimising norms concerning poverty elimination and participatory development. ECOWAS officials have sought to manoeuvre EU counterparts into a position whereby they are obliged to disburse greater aid resources and to fulfil moralised development pledges.
Drawing upon Bayart (2010) , this can usefully be understood as a process of elite extraversion whereby ECOWAS policymakers consciously seek to utilise the 'external' as a means of revenue generation. Whether in terms of historical appeals to 'francafrique' or the more recent mirroring of AfT/PSD discourse, West African elites seek to benefit from relations of dependency -in the sense of making gains from their compliance to European agendas. Rather than sit as mere victims of European (neo)colonialism, therefore, West African policymakers can be seen as active participants in their relationship with the external.
As the empirical analysis of the likely impact of EPA implementation illustrates, however, this ECOWAS elite compliance with the remit of free market reform does not bode well for ordinary workers and producers in the region. On the contrary, the roll-out of such neo-liberal prerogatives would likely have severe social consequences for the region's population as a whole -whether in terms of job losses in industries such as tomato agro-processing, or in terms of diminished social services in wake of reduced tariff revenues. Any aid resources gained within an EPADP would likely pale in comparison with the negative impacts of a fully-fledged free trade agreement. Certain prioritised sectors (and elites) might gain in the short term -but the medium to long term picture of EPA implementation is bleak in terms of regional development. Therefore, while it is the case that African elites do possess agency in their negotiations with Europe, nevertheless, this does not necessarily translate into greater gains for the population at large as has been often assumed and/or implied within existing studies (Hurt et al 2013; Zartman 1971) . Indeed, there should be scepticism as to whether the EPADP resources (if delivered) would be tangibly utilised for the benefit of the private sector (particularly in terms of kleptocracy in the region), and as to whether the business community could in fact thrive in the long-term in the liberalised conditions of the EPA.
As a final note, it should be re-emphasised that the consideration of ECOWAS elites in strategies of extraversion should not be read as a historical novelty. In fact, as discussed, earlier agreements such as the Lomé Conventions also evolved in negotiation with then prevailing norms in terms of calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). ACP policymakers, at that time, successfully appealed to the norms and ethics embedded in NIEO proposals in order to win gains such as the STABEX price support measure from their EEC counterparts.
And as discussed, West African elites historically sought to conform to prevailing norms of 'francafrique' in the 1950s in order to secure on-going assistance from the former French coloniser. Likewise, ECOWAS elites today, by appealing to PSD/AfT discourse seek to win resource gains in the form of an eventual EPADP. Just as with STABEX, however, such resources may prove ineffective in face of wider trade trends -particularly if, as the empirical evidence suggests, the EPA results in severe deindustrialisation and job losses in the region.
ECOWAS elite agency may reinforce regressive conditions for 'the poor' through acquiescence to asymmetric trade arrangements with the EU. Again, this stands in marked contrast to the agency of civil society activists in the region who repeatedly emphasise (in convincing manner) that the EPAs are incompatible with genuine development in West Africa.
